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This paper charts the evolution of online gambling in the US before and after the 
Unlawful Internet Gambling Enforcement Act (UIGEA) of 2006 which effectively 
prohibited online gambling in the US.  The paper stresses the importance of regulation in 
the US and elsewhere in explaining the key developments in this industry.  From the 
beginnings of online gambling the hostile approach of the US Department of Justice 
meant that the large US casinos did not enter this market leading to its domination by 
secretive offshore firms, some of whom went on to join the London Stock Exchange.  
Whilst this gave these firms credibility, their new status would eventually be their 
Achilles heel, as the responsibilities of being listed on a stock exchange meant they had 
to comply with the UIGEA.  However, in spite of the UIGEA many American citizens 
continued to gamble online with the demand being met by other offshore firms who had 
remained privately owned.  It is thus clear that prohibition does not work, meaning that 
the US needs to develop a regulatory regime which offers protection to its citizens who 
choose to gamble online. 
 




From the opening of the first online casino in 1994 online gambling would grow to an 
industry which generated revenues of $13 Billion in 2005 with 50% accounted for by the 
United States.1  However, the US Department of Justice (US DOJ) believed online 
gambling was a breach of the Wire Act of 1961, which prohibited interstate sports betting 
via the telephone, a position which meant that US firms did not enter this market enabling 
offshore start-ups to become dominant.2 
Online gambling was thus described by Eadington3 as an “invisible industry” dominated 
by secretive firms based in tax havens which either offered licenses or simply turned a 
blind eye.  However, the industry gradually became more visible from 2001 as a number 
of these firms controversially began to float on the London Stock Exchange (LSE).4  In 
contrast to the US the UK has a liberal approach to online gambling, having long since 
accepted online betting from its territory and in 2007 was the first major economy to 
license broader online gambling operations. 
From 2001 to 2006 14 online gambling firms which served the US market floated on the 
LSE with the largest being PartyGaming in 2005, which achieved a valuation of nearly 
£5 Billion, giving it a large r market value than British Airways.5  These flotations 
enabled the owners to sell stakes in the companies and gave credibility to the firms and 
the whole industry.  
However, many commentators believed that, in view of the US position, these flotations 
should not have been allowed and that never had the famous description by Keynes of the 
Stock Market as a casino seemed more apt6.  In response to their critics, the gambling 
firms and their advisers argued that their activities were legal, and that in any event they 
were subject to the law of their licensing authority, not the law of the US. 
Prominent US politicians, angered by the rise of online gambling, had made a number of 
attempts from 1997 to introduce new legislation to that would end online gambling in the 
US.  These attempts focused on updating the Wire Act or on prohibiting payments to 
online gambling firms.  As these legislative attempts faltered the US DOJ applied 
pressure to organisations which serviced the gambling industry – credit card issuers for 
payments and media firms for advertising – but the gambling firms simply found 
alternative methods. 
The inability to act against online gambling led many in the industry to believe they were 
untouchable but in the summer of 2006 the US authorities moved to assert their authority 
by arresting the executives of two LSE listed firms whilst in transit in American airports.  
This arrest was to highlight the fact that the listed status of the gambling firms – their 
                                                
1 PartyGaming, Annual Report 2005 available online at 
http://www.partygaming.com/images/docs/annual_report_complete.pdf. 
2 M. Charles, ‘Viewpoints, What Should the Owner of a Land-Based Casino Do About Internet 
Gambling?,’ Gaming Law Review, 6, 1, 2002, pp.5-8. 
3 W.R. Eadington, ‘The Future of Online Gambling in the United States and Elsewhere ’, Journal of Public 
Policy and Marketing, 23, 2, 2004, pp. 214-219. 
4 J. Kelly, M. Tew and L. Dubin, ‘The Global E-Gaming Industry: Why London, Why Now?’ Gaming Law 
Review, 9, 6, 2005, pp. 572-578. 
5 D. Laffey, ‘The Ultimate Bluff: A  Case Study of PartyGaming.com’, The Journal of Information 
Technology, 22, 4, 2007, forthcoming. 
6 J.M. Keynes, The general theory of employment, interest and money, 1936, MacMillan, London, 1936. 
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claim to respectability – could also be their Achilles heel, with their share prices falling 
sharply before being suspended, a suspension which for one of the firms (BetOnSports) 
would become permanent. 
In September 2006 the industry was to be dealt a crushing blow, with the passing of the 
Unlawful Internet Gambling Enforcement Act (UIGEA), prohibiting payments to 
gambling websites.  Once this legislation had been passed the listed firms could no longer 
hide behind arguments concerning legal uncertainties, as this Act sent out a clear message 
that the US Congress saw online gambling as illegal.  Continuation of service to US 
customers was not compatible with membership of the LSE and accordingly the LSE 
listed firms announced they were terminating service and the loss of a huge slice of their 
revenues.  The reaction of the markets was savage with large falls in share prices, 
PartyGaming for example losing 58% of its value in a day, and some firms closing down.  
However, this was not the end of online gambling in the US.  The UIGEA had allowed 
“carve-outs” or exemptions from the legislation for US operators who offered online 
gambling including lotteries and horseracing.7  In addition to this many privately owned 
offshore operators continued to target the US market, and whilst these firms faced a more 
difficult environment they found ways to work around the legislation.  
This paper charts the evolution of online gambling in the US.  The first section covers the 
essential background to the development of gambling in the US and its regulation.  The 
second section then analyses the emergence of online gambling in the US and the 
principles which emerged from online gambling cases dealt with in US courts.  The third 
section looks at the firms in this industry which listed on the LSE and how they managed 
to grow the industry in the face of advertising and media restrictions.  The fourth section 
analyses the attempts to legislate against online gambling, which eventually succeeded 
with the UIGEA, examining the “carve-outs” for certain types of domestically provided 
gambling.  Finally, the sixth section looks at the likelihood of the US introducing its own 




Gambling involves players attempting to gain from the outcome of an unknown event.  A 
distinction can be made in gambling between games of chance with random outcomes, 
such as slot machines and lotteries, and games which can involve some degree of skill, 
such as the card game poker and betting on sports or other events. 
The business of gambling involves an operator who provides gambling products and an 
environment in which these activities can take place.  In recent years the term “gaming” 
has become the preferred description of those in the industry in an attempt to describe the 
entertainment aspect of the activity and no doubt to escape its unsavoury associations.  
This paper, however, follows Wilson8 and keeps with the traditional term of gambling, as 
it is believed that this better captures the risk element and the potential for social harm. 
 
Gambling Regulation 
                                                
7 D.O. Stewart, ‘An analysis of Internet Gambling and its Policy Implications’, 2006, available online at 
http://www.americangaming.org/assets/files/studies/wpaper_internet_0531.pdf. 
8 M. Wilson, ‘Chips, bits, and the law: an economic geography of Internet gambling’, Environment and 
Planning, 35, 7, 2003, pp. 1245–1260. 
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The social harm caused by gambling and its appeal to criminal organisations have led to 
it being illegal or tightly regulated in most countries.  The decision to permit or liberalise 
gambling activity has often being simply an admission that gambling cannot be stopped, 
and that it is better to make legislative limitations upon gambling’s excesses, rather than 
leaving it in the hands of illegal operators.  This approach has the added benefit of 
allowing governments to capture the economic benefits and tax revenues flowing from 
gambling. 
The United States sets gambling legislation mostly at the state level.  Kearney explains 
how gambling in the United States was transformed from an industry with limited 
availability in the 1970s to one [in 2005] “that is extremely commonplace”. 9 
Outside of Nevada, which legalised gambling in 1931, provision was highly restricted 
with no other states permitting casinos and lotteries illegal in all American states.  Indeed, 
the casinos of Nevada were seen as something which should be closed down rather than 
allowed to expand. 10  But despite this, during the 1960s liberalisation of gambling laws 
did begin, with the introduction of a lottery in New Hampshire.  This was only followed 
by one other state (New York) in the 1960s, but in the 1970s twelve further states 
launched their own lotteries.  A hugely significant change also occurred when Nevada 
introduced the Corporate Gaming Act in 1969 which allowed listed companies to operate 
casinos.11  This enabled the entry of established brands from the hotel industry and which 
made gambling more acceptable.12  Authorised casinos then appeared in other states and 
the 1970s and 1980s saw the emergence of Native American Casinos, whereby casinos 
which operated on a tax free basis were permitted on reservations.  Other forms of 
liberalisation also occurred with, for example, the growth of slot machines in bars and 
racetrack casinos (known as racinos).  A key point here, made by many writers, is that 
once gambling starts to be liberalised a “domino effect” insues as neighbouring 
jurisdictions face the option of their citizens gambling in a nearby state with the 
associated social problems, but without any economic benefits and tax revenues.13 
This domino effect meant that by 1999 all states except Utah and Hawaii permitted some 
types of gambling, 14 which had enabled gambling revenues (after pay outs) to grow 
nearly three fold in real terms from 1982 to 1997. 15 
Consequently, many state governments have become heavily dependent on gambling 
revenues,16 leading to questions of their objectivity when considering issues of gambling 
regulation. 
                                                
9 M.S. Kearney, ‘The Economic Winners and Losers of Legalized Gambling’, National Tax Journal , 58, 
2005, pp. 281-302. 
10 W.R. Eadington, The economics of casino gambling, The Journal of Economic Perspectives , 13, 3, 1999, 
pp. 173-192 
11 T. Magder ‘Gambling, the WTO, and Public Morals: A Short Review of Antigua versus the United 
States’, Television and New Media , 7, 1, 2006, pp. 52–67. 
12 Eadington, op. cit. 
13 D. Paton, D. Siegel and L. Vaughan Williams ‘A Policy Response to the E-Commerce Revolution: The 
Case of Betting Taxation in the UK’, The Economic Journal, 112, 480, 2002, pp. 296-314. 
14 National Gambling Impact Study Commission Report, 1999, Washington, D. C, available online at 
http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/ngisc/. 
15 Eadington, op. cit. 






The first online casinos emerged in the mid 1990s.  McMillan links the emergence of 
online gambling to earlier ICT based developments in the industry such as telephone 
betting and the computerisation of lotteries. 17  She notes how online gambling, through 
the Internet or digital TV (which can now be expanded to include mobile phones) enables 
gambling to take place 24/7 on a global basis. 
Given the generally hostile approach of the US authorities gambling websites targeting 
the US market based themselves offshore, mainly in Caribbean islands such as Antigua 
and Costa Rica, which as well as offering a benign operating environment are also tax 
havens.  A statement made to the House of Representatives in 199818 stated that Antigua 
had first issued gambling licenses in 1996 and by 1998 had registered 31 gambling 
operations whilst Peterson notes that Costa Rica allowed operators to base themselves on 
its territory even though it had laws which prohibited gambling!  Costa Rican gambling 
firms were thus unlicensed and its environment was described by The Washington Times 
“as anything goes”. 19  In such an environment it was little surprise that the founders of 
two major operations were revealed to have had criminal records, being involved with 
bank fraud and organised crime.20  This highlighted a further concern of authorities in the 
US and elsewhere; the favoured locations for gambling were centres for money 
laundering.  In 2000 the UK Treasury warned UK financial institutions that there were 
“serious risks associated with involvement in transactions linked to the off-shore gaming 
industry”.21 
In such an unregulated environment online gambling took time to grow.  Many potential 
users felt uneasy about giving their personal details and financial information to offshore 
websites, and had good reasons, as some operators had acquired reputations for fixing the 
outcomes of games and/or refusing to make payouts.22  However, as the online 
population grew and the firms gained brand awareness online gambling revenues soared, 
reaching $13 Billion by 2005 with 50% of revenues originating from the US. 
 
The US legal situation 
 
Online gambling represents a clear threat to national regulation as it crosses national 
borders23.  The US DOJ argued that the Wire Act of 1961, which prohibited sports 
                                                
17 J. McMillen, ‘Online Gambling: Challenges to National Sovereignty and Regulation’, Prometheus, 18, 4, 
2000, pp. 391-401. 
18 K V. Di. Gregory, Statement of Kevin V. DI Gregory, to the U.S. House of Representatives concerning 
gambling on the Internet, June 24, 1998, available online at http://www.cybercrime.gov/kvd0698.htm. 
19 R.A. Peterson, ‘Internet Gaming in Costa Rica’, Gaming Law Review , 5, 2, 1999, pp. 89-100 
20 A. Cabot, ‘Internet Gambling: The Relationship between Legality and Integrity’, Gaming Law Review, 2, 
3, 1998, pp. 231-234. 
21 UK Treasury, JMLSG Money Laundering Guidance Notes for the Financial Sector. Equivalence Status 
of Other Countries, November, 2000, available online at  
http://www.hm-treasury.gov.uk./newsroom_and_speeches/press/2000/press__131_00guid.cfm. 
22 S. Watson, P. Jr. Liddell, R.S. Moore and W.D. Jr. Eshee, ‘The Legalization of Internet Gambling: A 
Consumer Protection Perspective’, Journal of Public Policy and Marketing, 23, 2, 2004, pp. 209-213. 
23 McMillen, op. cit 
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betting between states or internationally using a wire communication facility, made all 
forms of online gambling illegal.24  The view of the US DOJ was that gambling took 
place both in the jurisdiction of the website and the user, meaning that it fell within the 
jurisdiction of the Wire Act. 
Strong opposition to online gambling also existed in the US on religious and ethical 
grounds with prominent Republican politicians such as Jon Kyl, Bob Goodlatte and John 
Leach campaigning against it.  The arguments against the industry can be summarised as 
follows: 
Addiction: The National Council on Problem Gambling reported that 8% of their calls in 
2006 concerned online gambling, which is greater than the 5% online share of the total 
American gambling market.  Online gambling can also be done from the privacy of one’s 
home thus enabling addiction to be concealed. 
Moreover, research has shown tha t people those under 25 years of age are at higher risk 
of developing gambling addictions in general and this group has been identified as being 
at high risk of developing addictions online. 
Under-age gambling: The lowest minimum age for entry to a casino in the United States 
is 16 in Maine with some others allowing entry at 18.  However, most states have the 
higher minimum age of 21 (partly due to the availability of alcohol in these venues) 
which conflicts with the over 18 policy adopted by most websites. In addition to this the 
practical enforcement of age limits on websites, with users remote from the operator, 
presents further difficulties. 
Fairness: Concerns have been raised about gamblers being cheated by unscrupulous 
operators.  This led to the emergence of auditing services for online casinos, such as 
iTech Labs and standards bodies who aim to ensure fairness such as GamCare in the UK 
and the Interactive Gaming Council which offers more global coverage. 
Association with criminal activity: It has been alleged that criminals can use online 
gambling operations to launder money, an assertion which corresponds with the 
concentration of gambling websites in known centres for such activity.  These charges, in 
the post 9/11 environment, have expanded to cover the funding of terrorism.  There is a 
counter argument to this, namely that monies are sent electronically and can thus be 
monitored more easily than in land based casinos. 
 
Cases involving online gambling in the US  
 
Online betting  
 
In 1997 the US DOJ raided the US offices of a Grenada based gambling website.  
Following this, in 1998 the DOJ launched its first prosecutions against the owners and 
managers of gambling websites.25  Jay Cohen, a co-founder and President of World 
                                                
24 J.G. Malcolm, Statement of John G. Malcolm, Deputy Assistant Attorney General, US DOJ, Before the 
Subcommittee on Crime, Terrorism, and Homeland Security Committee on the Judiciary  
United States House of Representatives, April 29, 2003, available online at 
http://www.cybercrime.gov/Malcolmtestimony42903.htm. 
25 M. Brunker, ‘First Web bettors prosecuted’, ZDNet, March 5, 1998, available online at 
http://news.zdnet.com/2100-9595_22-508027.html. 
 8 
Sports Exchange, one of the people indicted, voluntarily returned to the United States, 
believing he could “beat the charges”.26 
World Sports Exchange (WSE) had been set up in 1996 by Cohen, a US financial trader, 
and others and was licensed in Antigua.  They had taken legal advice which led them to 
believe that that if their operations and assets were offshore they were not breaking US 
law.  WSE allowed gambling through its website and telephone operators, and had 
promoted its operation in the US by means of advertisements in the media.27 
In the ensuing court case, United States v. Cohen, Cohen argued WSE’s activities were 
legal, stating that the Wire Act could not be applied to the Internet and that WSE was 
subject to Antiguan law.  However, these arguments failed to persuade the jury and 
Cohen was found guilty of contravening the Wire Act, spending two years in jail.  The 
verdict might have come as a shock to Cohen, but was not a great surprise to 
commentators as WSE allowed sports betting over the telephone which was breach of the 
Wire Act, irrespective of any questions about gambling in the Internet age.  However the 
Judge in this case did look at the issues arising from online betting, stating that there was 
no difference between the telephone and Internet in the context of the Wire Act and that 
gambling took place in the jurisdiction of the gambler.  Under this interpretation the Wire 
Act clearly applied to sports betting over the Internet. 
A key practical point to note here is that WSE continued to operate throughout this period 
and are still in business nearly a decade after the charges were made, emphasising the 
limits in controlling a privately held offshore firm.  It seems, therefore, that Cohen’s chief 




The WSE case did not examine the legal status of casino-style games such as slot 
machines, roulette and poker.  There were other court judgements which offered differing 
interpretations.  In the 1999 case, People v. World Interactive Gaming Corp., the New 
York Supreme Court stated that online casino gaming was a breach of the Wire Act and 
as in United States v. Cohen, held that gambling took place in the jurisdiction of the 
gambler. 28  In contrast to this in 2001 in Thompson v. MasterCard International Inc. 
Judge Stanwood Duval of the US District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana 
stated “at this point in time, Internet casino gambling is not a violation of federal law”. 29  
Naturally, offshore casinos pointed to the Thompson v. MasterCard International Inc. 
Case to justify their activities and it was regularly cited in their company documents. 
 
The market and its firms  
 
                                                
26 K.B. Kramer, ‘The Jay Cohen Affair: Lessons in the Legality of Internet Betting’, Gaming Law Review, 
5, 6, 2001, 551-553. 
27 Electronic Commerce and Law Report, United States v. Jay Cohen, 2001, available online at 
http://pub.bna.com/eclr/001574.htm. 
28 Supreme Court, New York County, People v. World Interactive Gaming Corp., 1999, available at 
http://www.oag.state.ny.us/internet/litigation/wigc.pdf. 
29 United States Court Of Appeals, 2001, available online at 
caselaw.lp.findlaw.com/data2/circs/5th/0130389p.pdf. 
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In spite of the legal uncertainty the numbers of gambling firms targeting the US grew in 
the 1990s.  The US National Gambling Impact Study Commission’s report30 included 
two forecasts on the growth of online gambling, both of which estimated that revenues 
had doubled between 1997 and 1998, with estimates of $651 and $919.1 million 
respectively for 1998.  These were very much estimates and could not be relied upon as 
the firms in the industry were under no obligation to divulge data on their business. 
Gambling firms became adept at avoiding US attempts to restrict their activities, 
particularly in the areas of payment and adve rtising.  From 2003 the US DOJ pressurised 
credit card issuers into refusing to allow gambling payments.31  Along with the problem 
of disputed payments this led Citibank and American Express to withdraw services for 
gambling.  To overcome these problems e-wallets would become the major method of 
transferring funds in online gambling.  Funds were transferred to e-wallets from credit 
cards or bank accounts and these wallets could then be used to transfer and withdraw 
from gambling accounts.  The e-wallet thus took on the risk function and offered a low 
cost alternative to credit card transfers, creating value for all parties in online gambling.  
Two e-wallet firms dependent on gambling, Neteller and Fireone shown in Table 1 
below, listed on the LSE. 
In the advertising sphere the DOJ wrote to media firms urging them not to accept adverts 
from gambling firms.  Whilst this led to the search engines Yahoo and Google and the 
broadcaster Infinity declining to take gambling adverts there were problems of 
enforcement with other media firms not complying.  The gambling firms, cleverly (or 
deviously, depending on one’s interpretation), developed so-called educational websites 
which offered play gambling where no real money was used, but crucially evaded the 
advertising restrictions enabling their brand names to be promoted. 
 
The London Casino? 
 
From 2001 when the LSE admitted its first online gambling firm, SportingBet, more 
information became available on this industry as listed firms are obliged to report key 
data on their business.  As its name suggests, SportingBet’s main line of business was 
betting on sports events which it accepted through the telephone and its website.  
Accepting telephone bets was a blatant breach of the Wire Act and, if one took the Cohen 
case as authority, Internet betting would also be in breach of the Act.  The prospectus for 
SportingBet made clear these inherent risks of its business, stating:  
 
“It is likely that certain of the group's activities may constitute a violation of certain US 
federal statutes, including the federal wire act and the laws of certain individual states. 
The penalties for violations of these statutes include the possibility of significant fines 
and imprisonment of relevant individuals”32 
 
After SportingBet joined the LSE another 8 online gambling firms which served US 
markets and 5 specialist support firms, which facilitated such activities, also floated as 
                                                
30 National Gambling Impact Study Commission Report, op. cit. 
31 Watson et al., op. cit. 
32 N. Pratley, Prospectus warned of risky bet, The Guardian, September 8, 2006, available online at 
http://business.guardian.co.uk/viewpoint/story/0,,1867576,00.html. 
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shown in Table 1.  For most of these organisations the US accounted for the majority of 
their 2006 revenues, BetOnSports, for example having 95% of its revenue from the US, 
PartyGaming 71%, Neteller 85%, SportingBet 57%, with the lowest stated figure being 
38% from PlayTech.  Three of the firms in Table 1 offered sports betting meaning that in 
effect their business was based upon the inability of the US to take action against them, 
whilst the others were either focused on casino games or offered support services.  The 
total value of these firms on June 30 2006 (before the UIGEA) was £9.5 Billion which 
gives some indication of the sheer size of the market.  The total value one year later, after 
the UIGEA and the delisting of many firms, at about £3 Billion further illustrates the 
dependency of these firms on the US and the manner in which the legislation had 
impacted upon them. 
 









Value  £ millions  
June 30 2006  
Value £ millions 
June 30 2007  
PartyGaming 2005 Gambling  Gibraltar 4620 1265 
SportingBet 2001 Gambling  Alderney 1646 247 
Playtech  2006 Gambling  Alderney 730 836 
888 Hldgs 2005 Gambling  Gibraltar 721 389 
Neteller 2004 
Speciality 
Finance N/A 710 
 
Suspended 
Empire Online* 2005 
Media 

















Betonsports 2004 Gambling  Antigua 133 Delisted b 
World Gaming  2005 Software Antigua 127 Delisted b 
Leisure 
& Gaming 2005 Gambling  Curacao 80 
 
12 
Fairground 2006 Gambling  Kahnawake 33 Delisted b 
Betcorp 2006 Gambling  Antigua 21 Delisted b 
 
a Acquired 
b No longer operating 
*Renamed and exited gambling activities 
Source:  Developed using data from the London Stock Exchange  
 
Becoming listed on the LSE enabled gambling firms to raise capital and also gave them 
credibility with business partners and customers.  It can further be argued that this 
process increased the protection to gamblers as these companies were now far more 
transparent and had to have in place far clearer operating procedures. 
It also offered the founders of these firms an opportunity to profit from their stakes by 
creating a liquid market for shares.  Some saw this process as a re-run of the dot com 
boom and bust and were suspicious that the owners of the firms were seeking to make 
large profits before the market turned down or there was decisive action from the US.  
 11 
One year after the float of PartyGaming in June 2005 the owners had received nearly £1.2 
Billion through the sale of their shares. 33  Whether this was coincidence or not, one year 
after the final shares were sold the company’s share price had fallen by 73%. 
The flotations of these firms also generated lucrative fees for the high profile investment 
banks which acted as underwriters (for example Dresdner Kleinwort acted for 
PartyGaming, and HSBC for 888), and the law firms which acted as advisers (Freshfields 
acted for 888 and PartyGaming, whilst Linklaters advised Dresdner Kleinwort and HSBC 
on both of these flotations).34  It should be noted that no US banks were involved with the 
gambling flotations, wisely being fearful of the consequences. 
The road to prohibition 
 
There had been a number of attempts to prohibit online gambling from 1997 before the 
successful passing of the UIGEA in 2006.  Before analysing these attempts it is important 
to note that certain forms of online gambling are permitted in the US as outlined by 
Stewart:35 
 
Wagering – The Interstate Horseracing Act allows online wagering (betting) on horse 
and dog racing for US citizens over 21 with exemptions for those from certain states.  See 
www.youbet.com for an example. 
 
Fantasy Sports – People can participate in simulated online sports events for which the 
winners receive prizes.  See http://sports.espn.go.com/fantasy for an example. 
 
Nevada – Wireless gambling was authorised in 2005 providing gamblers were on 
licensed premises.   Station Casinos also allow account holders residents based in Las 
Vegas to place sports bets via a virtual private network. 
 
Lotteries – Tickets can be bought in store and checked online in some states, and a 
second chance option is provided by some whereby a ticket’s number is entered online to 
see if it is successful. 
 
Finally, share trading is not included in any restrictions of online gambling, which with 
the growth of day trading and the associated risks for individuals, seems particularly 
ironic. 
 
The first attempt to ban online gambling was The Internet Gambling Prohibition Act 
(1997) which looked to broaden the scope of the Wire Act “to all forms of Internet 
                                                
33 Forbes, Faces In The News, Forbes, June 6, 2006, available online at 
http://www.forbes.com/facesinthenews/2006/06/09/vodafone-carpone-baa-cx_cn_0610ukfaceweek.html;  




34 J. Baxter, High stakes - Internet Poker: Bubble or Bust, 2006, available online at 
http://www.mishcon.com/downloads/53/LB160_p50-54_OnlineGaming.pdf. 
35 Stewart, op. cit. 
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gambling”36 and made it criminal to place and take bets online.  This was passed by the 
Senate but failed in the House of Representatives following concerns about the 
criminalisation of US citizens, but also as a result of pressure from US operators who 
offered regulated forms of online gambling.  An amended form of this Bill later failed to 
pass both Houses  
A different focus was used in 2001 with the Unlawful Internet Gambling Funding 
Prohibition Act which aimed to make the transfer of funds for the purposes of online 
gambling illega l.  This Act passed through the House of Representatives but failed in the 
Senate. 
Further attempts were then made to prohibit online gambling but none were successful 
until 2006.  This was in no small part due to lobbyists employed by online gambling 
groups, with the most well known being Jack Abramoff, who was eventually jailed for 
fraud in 2005. 37 
In 2006 it seemed as though the latest attempt at legislation, the UIGEA, would fail.  The 
UIGEA made it illegal to transmit funds to “unlawful Internet gambling” operations , 
whilst allowing exemptions for certain forms of domestic gambling.  In March 2006 the 
Act passed through the House of Representatives but it was thought there would not be 
enough time for it to be passed by the Senate. 
Indeed, the online gambling industry felt that legislative action would just remain a 
potential threat, which for regulatory reasons they had to warn shareholders about.  
Statements made in public announcements at the time make this clear.  The CEO of 
Empire Online, for example, commented in April 2006 “I am used to US regulatory 
threats as an ever present ‘soundtrack’ to the industry”, 38 whilst the (soon to be jailed) 
CEO of BetOnSports stated in July 2006 that the chances of successful legislation in this 
area were “remote”. 39 
However, the jailing and exposure of Abramoff had strengthened the position of the 
supporters of the UIGEA and in September 2006 the Act was attached to an unrelated 
piece of legislation, the Safe Port Act, a piece of legislation seen as essential to US 
security, which had strong support from both parties in the Senate.  This subterfuge 
meant that the UIGEA was not even debated in the Senate before it was passed as part of 
the Safe Port Act. 
The passing of the UIGEA represented a seismic shift for the LSE listed firms.  In the 
same way that regulation had prevented US firms from entering this market and enabled 
these firms to emerge, their status and responsibilities as LSE companies forced them to 
exit this market.  The UIGEA and its aftermath also guaranteed an end to the flotations of 
gambling firms which served the US market, meaning that this phenomenon would only 
restart if the US introduced its own regulatory regime. 
In contrast, many privately owned firms, free from the regulatory constraints of the stock 
market, stated they would continue to serve the US market.  In the first month after the 
UIGEA ComScore, the Web monitoring firm, reported that US traffic to gambling 
                                                
36 Watson et al., op. cit. 
37 S. Kirchgaessner,. Gaming websites tied to Abramoff, The Financial Times, October 5, 2006, available 
online at http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/b89d2e4e-54a6-11db-901f-0000779e2340.html. 
38 Empire Online Annual Report, 2005, available at 
http://www.ep.com/documents/EOL%20FINAL%202005.pdf. 
39 BetOnSports AGM Statement, 14 July, 2006, available at http://www.advfn.com/news_AGM -
Statement_16130650.html. 
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websites fell by 27%.  However, many customers soon switched to the private operators 
with large increases in US traffic in June 2007 to the private firms PokerStars, 
UltimateBet and Full Tilt Poker.40 
The UIGEA made it more difficult for these firms to serve US markets as many payment 
providers complied with the legislation, but there were ways around the ban.  Firstly, 
monitoring payments to online gambling websites was not a straightforward matter and 
managing compliance presented major problems.  Evidence of this is the advice on the 
UltimateBet website in October 2007 which recommends Visa and Mastercard as 
payment methods for US customers.  Secondly, as payment firms withdrew service, new 
ones simply emerged.  Finally, the  Act also does not cover checks, 40 billion of which 
are written in the United States every year.41 
 
The uncertain future? 
 
Some saw the UIGEA as hypocritical with its carve-outs.  They also believed that it was 
a regressive step, given that offshore gambling would continue but through well less 
known, and arguably less reputable, sites.  Furthermore, it was argued the US was 
following a protectionist policy, and was therefore in breach of its WTO obligations .  In 
2004 Antigua brought a case against the United States, in 2005 winning a ruling that the 
Wire Act and various state laws were against international trade laws.  The US was given 
until April 2006 to comply with the ruling but did not do so.  After the September 2006 
legislation there was speculation that a further case could be brought to the WTO, 
although many saw this as the online gambling firms clutching at straws. 
There were legislative efforts at reform.  In 2007 the Democratic Senator Barney Frank 
introduced the Internet Gambling Regulation and Enforcement Act (IGREA) 2007 which 
“which would license, legalize, and regulate Internet gambling”.  This would be done in a 
manner which complied with existing gambling regulations in the US and also build in 
protections against addiction and under age gambling. 42  Frank argued regulation was 
logical as most US states allowed some form of gambling anyway and the lack of 
regulation resulted in US citizens who chose to gamble online having no protection under 
US law.  Bringing gambling websites onshore would also allow tax revenues to be 
generated.  Watson et al argue for legalisation through US casinos and lay out key 
principles which would protect users, stating that, if online gambling was legalised, the 
US Casinos would soon become dominant through their brands, which would bring many 
US gamblers into a more responsible gambling environment.43 
Some in the gambling industry also felt that regulation would come, and pointed to the 
UK’s move, as the first major state, to license casino style gambling in 2007.  It should be 
noted, however, that the UK experience thus far, however, has not been successful in 
                                                
40 ComScore, Press Release - comScore Media Metrix Releases Top 50 Web Rankings for June, July 16, 
2007, available online at http://www.comscore.com/press/release.asp?press=1528. 
ComScore, Press Release - comScore Media Metrix Releases October Top 50 U.S. Web Rankings and 
Analysis, November 13, 2006, available at http://www.comscore.com/press/release.asp?press=1063. 
41 I. Nelson Rose, The Unlawful Internet Gambling Enforcement Act of 2006 Analyzed, available online at 
http://www.gamblingandthelaw.com/columns/2006_act.htm. 
42 American Gaming Association, Internet Gaming, 2007, available online at 
http://www.americangaming.org/Industry/factsheets/issues_detail.cfv?id=17. 
43 Watson et al., op. cit. 
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attracting offsho re casino operators as such operators were unsurprisingly unwilling to 
increase their tax burdens.  Despite this, PartyGaming, in their 2006 Annual Report, cited 
the view of Global Betting and Gaming Consultants44, one of the largest gambling 
consultancies in the world, that the US will move to a regulated environment within five 
years, presumably because this timescale would allow for an end to Republican control of 
both houses of Congress. 
Online gambling might well be come to be legally accepted in the US , but in the short 
term, however, the US has isolated itself in an increasingly global world.  It has the 
largest gambling industry in the world and it is inevitable that some of its Web enabled 
citizens will choose to gamble online.  There are many reasons to restrict and control 
gambling provision but prohibition does not work and will simply take offshore gambling 
back to the secretive era of the 1990s.  The Internet genie is well and truly out of the 
bottle and the offshore gambling industry has proved adept at avoiding restrictions and 
finding new ways of working.  Perhaps the key question for the future is how long it will 
take US legislators to become as adept at adjusting to the changing world, however they 
might dislike it, for the benefit and  protection of their citizens? 
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